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Summary 
After the crisis, the longstanding debate on a European unemployment benefits scheme (EUBS) 
was revived as part of a much larger debate on the need for a supranational automatic stabilisation 
function for Europe. The American unemployment insurance (UI) system, given its two-tier 
structure, has often been regarded as a model for a potential EUBS. Previous research has 
examined the lessons to be learned from the US UI. This paper builds on this literature but goes 
one step further as it carefully assesses whether the lessons from the US system could actually be 
implemented in a European context. Indeed, while there are important parallels between the US 
and the EU in some areas, significant differences in others may complicate implementation or even 
render it impossible. In this paper, the aim, therefore, is to identify the aspects of the US system to 
draw inspiration from – in light of the EU’s institutional and political realities – and explain how they 
inform a potential EUBS. This exercise concentrates on the design and implementation of a 
potential EUBS. The paper highlights that a two-tier system helps to better attain the goals of 
unemployment insurance, as demonstrated by the American experience. It also shows the 
advantages of being pragmatic and taking an incentives-based approach. Other issues, such as 
solidarity and redistribution, seem more difficulty to tackle in Europe than in the American context 
and would require further examination. Finally, discretionary measures should be considered with 
caution. 
JEL codes: E24, E63, F45, H12, H53, J65  
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1. Introduction 
The European Union has been in troubled waters for a decade. With the global crisis starting in 
2008, the subsequent eurozone debt crisis, the rapid growth of Euroscepticism and then Brexit, 
2017 not only marks the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome but also an important moment 
to reflect on the future of the European project.  
One topic that has received a lot of attention is the further development of EMU, as the crisis 
demonstrated shortcomings in the EMU’s institutional architecture (Andor, 2016). This has re-
launched the debate about a supranational automatic stabiliser for Europe. In this regard, one 
option under consideration is a common European unemployment benefits scheme (EUBS), 
inspired by the American UI system (Alcidi and Thirion, 2017). Yet while the discussion on a 
European UI has mostly focused on the stabilisation capacities of the scheme, its potential 
social impacts should not be overlooked. The idea that “Europe is not social enough” (to quote 
Jean-Claude Juncker)1 has gained traction, and an EUBS could also be a way to partly fill that 
gap. 
The American unemployment insurance (UI) is a two-tier system, with two levels of 
government – the 53 ‘states’ (the 50 American states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands) and the federal government – that interact and complement each 
other in the provision of UI. Many of the existing EUBS proposals aim to establish a similar two-
tier structure: i.e. a UI system involving the different member states as well as a European, 
supra-state, dimension.  
To avoid confusion, in this paper we refer to the lower level of government (in terms of 
geographical coverage) – composed of the 53 American states and the 28 EU member states – 
as ‘state’. The higher level of government – i.e. the federal government in the US or any 
potential supra-state entity involved in the provision of UI in Europe – is referred to as the 
‘supra-state’. This paper does not address the general question of the rationale behind 
unemployment insurance. Instead, we focus on the goals, value-added and main challenges of 
involving the supra-state level of government in the establishment or funding of UI, rather than 
having UI determined only by the states independently. 
While Europe and the United States differ significantly with respect to their economies, social 
issues, political preferences, history and culture, there are important parallels that make the 
                                                     
1 Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union address, 14 September 2016. 
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American UI system an interesting model for a potential EUBS. Having said this, the fact that 
the American UI system functions in a way that reflects national realities and responds to its 
specific challenges means that it cannot simply be copied to the European context.  
With this paper, we aim to contribute to the debate by identifying lessons that can be learned 
from the American UI system and assessing their applicability for Europe. Our work is based on 
extensive review of the literature, with a specific focus on recent work on a European 
unemployment benefit scheme and studies that compare such a potential EUBS with the US 
system. Some of the latter work highlights the lessons that can be learned from the American 
system, but few of these studies challenge these lessons or consider whether they can actually 
be applied, which is the key aspect. 
We start by identifying similarities in the issues that both systems face and in the goals they 
pursue. We further assess the differences in how these goals and issues are expressed in the 
US and in Europe. Europe can learn from the longstanding US experience on how to manage a 
two-tiered UI system, which also means that unexpected challenges and shortcomings 
experienced in the US provide valuable lessons for Europe. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the current American 
federal-state system, describes the European context and different options that can be 
envisioned for an EUBS. Section 3 synthesises the goals and value-added of the involvement of 
the supra-state level in UI. The following two sections deal with important issues that any two-
tier UI system faces: the issue of solidarity and redistribution between states (section 4) and 
the trade-off between flexibility and harmonisation regarding how the system works in each 
state (section 5). Section 6 is about a more specific issue that comes up when supra-state 
involvement is used to offset large economic shocks: should temporary programs be activated 
automatically or be discretionary? The final section of the paper sets out the conclusions and 
policy recommendations. 
2. The American and European unemployment insurance systems and options for a 
common European unemployment benefits scheme 
 The American unemployment insurance system 
The US unemployment insurance system is a ‘federal-state’ system that was introduced in 1935 
with the Social Security Act. The UI system is an important part of the US social security 
program, directly paying out benefits to eligible unemployed workers. To be eligible for UI 
benefits, individuals have to be out of work, through no fault of their own, demonstrate 
workforce attachment, and be able and available for work (US DOL, 2016). As the US UI scheme 
is rather complex, we focus here on the core features, which are examined in more depth in 
the remaining parts of the paper. For a comprehensive overview of the UI system, we refer to 
US DOL (2016). 
Under the US UI system, each state finances its own unemployment insurance through payroll 
taxes paid by employers. Important features related to the unemployment benefits, including 
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the weekly benefit amount, the duration of benefits and most of the eligibility requirements 
for benefit receipt, are determined at the state level in an independent way. This has resulted 
in substantial differences between the states. In addition to the state taxes, employers pay a 
federal unemployment tax on wages paid to employees. The full federal tax rate is high, but in 
states in conformity with a series of federal requirements employers receive up to a 90% credit 
against the federal unemployment tax.  The federal government also provides states with 
grants to administer their UI programs if the states conform to a set of additional requirements. 
Federal requirements include experience rating (the rate of state unemployment taxes 
assigned to a given employer must be higher for employers who created more unemployment) 
and a prohibition on using unemployment trust funds for anything other than unemployment 
benefit payments. In other words, the federal level (the Department of Labor) puts forward 
guidelines and standards that states must follow (as a condition of tax credit and grant receipt), 
while leaving the implementation and design of the scheme to the state (Alcidi and Thirion, 
2017). In practice, all 53 states comply with federal requirements and receive the tax credit. 
Besides this regular UI, the US system is also equipped with temporary federal programs such 
as the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC)2 and the permanent Extended Benefits 
(EB) program, which extend the duration of benefits in case of economic downturn. EB is 
generally available in a given state if the total unemployment rate exceeds trigger levels in that 
state (and under permanent law are partially financed at the federal level and partially financed 
at the state level).3 EUC and similar federal programs are launched in a discretionary way in all 
states. These programs are fully financed by the federal government. The federal government 
does not pay unemployment benefits directly to unemployed individuals: states receive money 
from the federal government to finance the temporary federal programs and are responsible 
for their administration. 
Revenue from federal tax is earmarked for three main uses. First, it is used to finance the 
administrative costs of UI. Second, federal tax revenue is used to finance temporary federal 
programs (such as the EUC and EB). Third, it is used to provide loans to states that run out of 
money to finance their UI benefits.4 Note, however, that some states opted to issue bonds 
during the Great Recession rather than borrow from the federal government to avoid the 
likelihood that employers would have to pay higher contributions.  
                                                     
2 Earlier programs similar to EUC had different names. More details on these programs can be found on: 
https://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/spec_ext_ben_table.asp.  
3 In the original design, Extended Benefits programs in a given state are financed both by the state (50%) and the 
federal government (the other 50%). However, during the Great Recession, 100% federal funding was provided. 
Note that the mandatory trigger for EB is based on the insured rather than the total unemployment rate, but this 
is not very responsive. States have used the optional total unemployment rate trigger instead. 
4 These loans may offer better rates to states than normal financial markets because under certain circumstances, 
interest is only charged on loans that are not repaid by the end of the fiscal year in which they were obtained and 
because interest rates may be lower than what is available from the financial markets.  
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 Unemployment insurance in Europe: current situation and the potential for a 
common EUBS 
In the European Union, UI is only provided at the state level; there is no supra-state entity 
involved. Unemployment insurance schemes exist in one way or another in all EU countries and 
were created in most countries in the years following WWII.5 There are large differences in the 
design and implementation of UI provision among EU member states (Esser et al., 2013; 
Beblavý and Maselli, 2014b; Beblavý et al., 2015). One striking example is the duration of 
benefits, which range from less than six months in some countries (e.g. Hungary) to very long 
durations in others (e.g. in Belgium, unemployment benefits have an unlimited duration) 
(European Commission, 2013). Esser et al. (2013) present a taxonomy of unemployment 
insurance schemes, distinguishing between five models that can be identified in Europe: 
targeted, voluntary state subsidised, state corporatist, compulsory basic security and 
compulsory income security. 
The idea of involving the supra-state level in the provision of UI in Europe has much been 
debated in recent years. In fact, there are many different possibilities. First, the involvement of 
a supra-state or European level can be limited to guidelines that states must or are incentivised 
to follow. However, research conducted so far considers a much more ambitious European UI 
in which there would be a supra-state dimension to benefit financing. Many schemes have 
already been investigated, with different financial transfer options. The main distinction is 
whether these schemes were genuine or equivalent schemes (Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017).6 
Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017) consider as genuine EUBS the schemes that would pay 
unemployment benefits directly to unemployed individuals (i.e. a direct transfer from the 
supra-state level to the individual, though in practice it would run through the existing state-
level infrastructure) and would be funded through contributions from employers and 
employees. An equivalent EUBS, by contrast, is one in which financial transfers for an EUBS 
would occur between the state and a supra-state entity. We do not focus on one specific form 
of EUBS but consider the idea of involving the supra-state level in an EUBS, be it genuine or 
equivalent. Moreover, the American UI is neither a purely genuine nor a purely equivalent 
scheme according to the criteria used in the work of Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017). Rather, it 
combines elements of both types of schemes.  
                                                     
5 Germany, for example, had UI before the US (introduced in 1927). In most EU countries, however, UI was 
introduced only after WWII. In France, for instance, it was only established in 1958. 
6 Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017) consider in the ‘equivalent’ category only those schemes that are only activated 
when the rate of short-term unemployment exceeds a trigger threshold level, so that the transfers occur only 
when they are most needed. Conversely, they consider in the ‘genuine’ category only schemes with no trigger, i.e. 
always activated. Nevertheless, these are not the only options that exist. Other studies have imagined equivalent 
schemes with no trigger, or genuine schemes with triggers. The issue of how to decide when the system should 
be activated is discussed more in depth in Section 6.  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN AMERICA: A MODEL FOR EUROPE? | 5 
 
3. What are the goals and value-added of a supra-state unemployment benefit 
scheme? 
Public unemployment insurance has various goals, such as avoiding the shortcomings of private 
UI, improving job matching in the economy, providing macroeconomic stabilisation and 
redistributing income among individuals (see Box 1 for more details). The subject we focus on 
in this paper is the extent to which those goals are achievable without supra-state intervention 
in a two-tier UI system.  To what extent, in a union or federation of states like the US or EMU – 
which is also a single market and a currency union – does the involvement of the higher level 
of government in the provision of UI allow better attainment of its objectives? In addition to 
the general goals of public UI, a supra-state UI may have additional goals that a state UI does 
not have. For example, an EUBS may aim to reinforce the European Union through better social 
protection, which could make the advantages of the EU more tangible for European citizens. 
Box 1. The general goals of public unemployment insurance 
The academic literature on the provision of UI by public authorities has identified various objectives 
and rationales. From the perspective of neoclassical economic theory, it may be argued that a public 
UI addresses the shortcomings of a private UI, which would face market failures (adverse selection in 
particular) and positive externalities. It may also be argued that UI relaxes job seekers’ budget 
constraints and allows them to better choose their jobs, thereby improving job matching in the 
economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, the usefulness of UI is to stabilise the economy by 
automatically dampening fluctuations in GDP: when a country is hit by an economic shock, the 
increase in unemployment automatically triggers an increase in public expenditure for 
unemployment benefits that has a positive impact7 on GDP.  
Those economic goals are not the only rationales for UI. Other goals, which are just as fundamental, 
are assisting jobless workers through income support and ensuring a certain level of redistribution 
among individuals. The latter argument is one of the possible results of philosophical reflections on 
justice and fairness in a society, such as John Rawls’ theory of the “veil of ignorance” (Rawls, 1971.)8  
 Addressing coordination issues in a single market: interstate competition and 
spillover effects 
A primary reason for the intervention of the supra-state dimension in the provision of UI, in any 
two-tier political architecture, is interstate competition regarding labour costs and social 
protection. The underlying theoretical reasoning is the following: with the implementation of a 
single market that includes several states or countries, free movement of goods, capital, 
                                                     
7 One additional euro of public expenses in unemployment benefits may even induce an increase of GDP that is 
greater than one euro, thanks to the multiplier effect. In the Keynesian theory, the multiplier effect is because the 
additional euro of public expenses creates one additional euro of income, which in turn is spent (at least partly) 
on consumption and thus creates additional income. 
8 Of course, another question is the desirable level of redistribution among individuals in a society. That is a tricky 
question, which we do not address in this paper. 
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services, and people makes it appealing for states to lower their labour costs to attract firms 
from the other states.  
That is precisely why supra-state involvement was necessary in the US when UI was created. 
Until the Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935, during the depths of the Great Depression, no state 
had a social insurance program for jobless workers. While the need for such a program was 
acute and several states considered legislation to authorise the creation of UI, no programs 
were implemented prior to the federal enactment, because the issue of interstate competition 
could not be overcome. It can also be understood as an example of the classic ‘prisoners’ 
dilemma’: without certainty about what the others would do, each party makes a suboptimal 
choice that mitigates their risk should the other parties fail to make the socially optimal choice. 
In this case, the overriding concern was that if a state creates a UI program and assesses taxes 
on employers to fund the program but the neighbouring states do not, employers would leave 
the state with the higher tax burden. The SSA elegantly solved that problem by eliminating the 
basic competitive disadvantage. It established a federal unemployment tax that employers in 
all states have to pay. However, if a state has a UI program that meets certain requirements, 
employers in that state receive up to a 90% credit against the federal unemployment tax. Even 
taking state unemployment taxes into account, it would be possible for employers to have 
higher total unemployment tax payments in states that do not have UI programs.9 As a result, 
even though the SSA did not technically require the states to create UI programs, all of them 
did. Strong incentives are what helped overcome interstate competition and enabled states to 
create UI programs. 
In the EU, the competition among member states regarding labour costs and social protection 
is often referred to as ‘social dumping’, which can be defined as “downward pressure on social 
conditions due to competition from countries with lower social conditions” (Sapir, 2015). In the 
current political and economic climate in the EU, social dumping is a much debated issue (for 
instance, the European Parliament adopted a resolution about social dumping in the European 
Union in September 2016).10 Learning from the historical experience that led to enactment of 
the SSA in the US, an EUBS could contribute to the fight against social dumping in Europe, 
through a certain degree of harmonisation of national systems. That harmonisation could be 
                                                     
9 Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), two credits are available to employers in states with laws that 
meet all requirements. The ‘normal’ credit is for the amount of state unemployment taxes the employer paid. The 
‘additional’ credit is for the difference between the normal credit and the amount the employer would have paid 
had it been assigned a 5.4% tax rate. The maximum total tax credit is 5.4 percentage points. Both credits are 
needed to ensure that experience rating of state unemployment taxes has the desired effect. (Without the 
additional credit, employers with ‘good’ experience would pay higher FUTA taxes than employers with ‘bad’ 
experience. Thus, the total unemployment tax bill — both federal and state — for both sets of employers could 
be comparable.) Regarding interstate competition, if a state does not have a UI program, employers in the state 
would have to pay the full 6.0% FUTA. If a state has a UI program that meets the requirements of FUTA, the federal 
tax rate would be 0.6%. If the employer had ‘good’ experience, its state unemployment tax rate could be quite 
low. If it were 1.0%, its total unemployment tax would be 1.6%. Thus, employers in a state with a UI program could 
pay lower unemployment taxes than employers in a state without a UI program. 
10 See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2016-
0255+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
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achieved either through a genuine system that would replace (at least partly) or supplement 
existing national systems, or through an equivalent system with minimum standards for 
national schemes. It should be noted that although social dumping is frequently mentioned in 
the political debate, there does not seem to be strong empirical evidence of its existence in 
Europe. For example, some researchers pointed out that the differences in labour taxes do not 
seem to provide a sufficient incentive for business relocation, especially from the ‘old’ to the 
‘new’ member states (Maslauskaitė, 2013).  
In addition to interstate competition, a lack of coordination between states can lead to a 
suboptimal level of social protection, which is what economists call ‘spillover’ effects (Beblavý 
and Lenaerts, 2017). Spillover effects are likely to occur in a single market without coordination 
of social protection, like Europe. Due to the high level of economic integration in Europe, a 
shock in one country also has negative impacts on neighbouring countries. Similarly, a fiscal 
policy – such as unemployment benefits – that stabilises the economy in one country also has 
positive impacts on neighbouring countries. These effects are externalities that may lead 
countries to underestimate the gains of their fiscal policy and may result in suboptimal levels 
of social protection. A common stabiliser would be helpful to overcome these issues. 
The American example is an important one for the EU case, although one has to keep in mind 
that the starting point and institutional context are very different. While in the US the state UI 
schemes had not been developed prior to commencement of supra-state involvement, the 
opposite applies to the European context. Furthermore, the substantial divergences in the UI 
systems that exist in the EU today reflect national preferences and institutional differences that 
may be very difficult to align. At the same time, these substantial divergences are precisely 
what necessitate improved coordination.  
 Relaxing budget constraints to improve macroeconomic stabilisation 
Most studies conceptualise a potential European UI as typically involving financial transfers 
between the states and a supra-state entity (either through state-level, or individual and/or 
employer-level contributions and payment); that is under the assumption that such a UI would 
not be limited to a set of guidelines on how states may set the parameters of their UI. Those 
transfers correspond to a supra-state insurance that pools risks at a broader than state level. 
As economic cycles vary among states, they may offset each other. Thus, the increase in 
unemployment benefits in a state experiencing a shock might be partially financed through 
transfers from the states that are not hit by that shock. The cost of financing unemployment 
benefits in states where UI is addressed at a supra-state level is likely to be lower than in states 
that would borrow on their own on financial markets to cover all costs for unemployment 
benefits. Supra-state involvement in UI thus relaxes the impact of budget constraints on UI and 
raises their potential stabilisation impact: the impact of public unemployment benefit 
expenditures on GDP is larger if those public expenditures do not need to be fully offset by tax 
increases or by incurring more debt (Bayoumi and Masson, 1998; Enderlein et al., 2013). 
Moreover, in the event of severe crisis in a given state, reduced budgetary constraints minimise 
the necessity or likelihood of unemployment benefits being cut.  
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The mitigated budgetary impact made possible by federal involvement in UI is especially 
important in currency unions like EMU or the US (Enderlein et al., 2013). One reason is that a 
state has fewer options to lessen the risk of default when it enters a currency union, because 
it has to issue its debt in the common currency, which means that it cannot use monetary policy 
to alleviate the impact of increased debt. States in a currency union may not have sufficient 
access to capital markets during recessions if doubts arise about the viability of their debt. This 
may undermine their capacity to finance UI. The second reason is that the absence of monetary 
policy at the state level removes the most important device to absorb temporary 
macroeconomic shocks. Currency unions can rely on the common monetary policy to deal with 
symmetric shocks affecting the currency area as a whole, but the absorption of asymmetric 
shocks impacting only some states of the union becomes much more difficult.  
Yet, asymmetric economic shocks are precisely what the European Union has been facing in 
recent years (Enderlein et al., 2013). While it has been argued that labour mobility and/or wage 
elasticity are mechanisms besides monetary policy that could provide necessary adjustments, 
strong wage rigidities in many euro area countries (Allard et al., 2013) and low labour mobility 
in Europe (Alcidi et al., 2016) have prevented these mechanisms from providing efficient 
stabilisation. Moreover, in the years following the 2008 economic crisis, European countries 
were unable to achieve efficient stabilisation through fiscal policy on their own, mostly because 
of high debt, the EU’s fiscal rules, and financial market constraints (Beblavý and Maselli, 2014b; 
Alcidi and Thirion, 2016; Poghosyan, 2016). One of the most important goals of an EUBS would 
therefore be to provide fiscal stabilisation and fill this gap.11 
In the US some supra-state aspects of the UI system have been efficient in providing 
macroeconomic stabilisation. As mentioned above, in the US the federal government makes 
benefits more generous in a variety of ways in the event of major economic downturn. The 
permanent EB program, which is partially federally funded, becomes available in states whose 
unemployment rates exceed certain levels. The federal government also created the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program, extending the duration of benefits, 
and in the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA), among other things, increased all 
UI weekly benefit amounts by $25. These programs were fully financed by the federal level. 
Vroman (2010) estimated the macroeconomic stabilisation impact of unemployment benefits 
in the US during the Great Recession and found that, on top of the regular UI program, the 
emergency extensions of benefits also played an important stabilising role. The emergency 
programs could be a valuable source of inspiration when designing an EUBS.  
Another interesting characteristic of the American system is the possibility for states to borrow 
from a federal account – often at a lower price than those of normal financial markets – to 
finance their UI if reserves are exhausted. This is a typical example of how federal involvement 
                                                     
11 Another question is: why are unemployment benefits better than other fiscal policy tools? There are three 
arguments to support the position that an EUBS is the ideal tool (Beblavý et al., 2015). First, it is quintessentially 
counter-cyclical. Second, because households that lose a source of income need to sustain their consumption 
levels, UI has a strong multiplier effect. Finally, it is activated automatically in a crisis. 
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may relax budget constraints and create more financial leeway. Some 36 states borrowed from 
the US Treasury between 2009 and 2013 (O’Leary and Barnow, 2016). In Europe, some 
countries (France and Croatia, for example) decreased the generosity of their UI during the 
crisis (European Commission, 2011), which would perhaps have been avoided with financial 
support from the EU. However, in the US, those federal loans did not prevent a few states from 
scaling down the generosity of their UI after the crisis (O’Leary and Barnow, 2016). 
Nonetheless, it may have been worse without federal involvement, and may also be evidence 
of the need for an even greater federal role in the US.  
 Improving social protection and redistribution 
Another potential consequence of supra-state involvement in UI is achieving a higher level of 
social protection and redistribution of income among individuals. For instance, thanks to the 
relaxation of budget constraints, supra-state involvement in UI in the US made it possible to 
maintain more generous unemployment benefits during the 2008 economic crisis than the 
benefits that would have been disbursed without supra-state intervention. As a result, several 
authors suggest that the emergency enhancements of benefits during the crisis prevented an 
increase in poverty in the US (Sherman, 2011; Gabe and Whittaker, 2012). 
In Europe, improved social protection could make the advantages of the EU more tangible for 
its citizens, and thus increase trust in the institutions. This would be an important potential 
consequence of an EUBS, as many recent events – such as the 2016 vote in favour of Brexit – 
have underlined the increasingly widespread feeling of distrust towards the EU. As 
Eurobarometer (2014) shows, since the 2008 economic and financial crisis, the feeling among 
EU citizens that their country’s membership is a good thing has generally decreased. The 
decline is the largest in some of the countries that were most affected by the crisis, such as 
Greece and Spain. Given their very high levels of unemployment, it seems likely that these 
countries, in particular, would have benefited from an EUBS. According to the same study, 
people regard unemployment as the main issue facing their country (Eurobarometer, 2014). 
Moreover, when asked what would strengthen the feeling of EU citizenship, the response with 
the highest support was “A European social welfare system harmonised between the member 
states” (over 40% of respondents). The European Commission has acknowledged the need for 
a more social Europe and recently launched the “European Pillar of Social Rights”. An EUBS 
would be an important step toward a more social Europe. 
4. Solidarity – does sharing the advantages of union mean sharing its burdens? 
Financial transfers between the supra-state entity and the states mean that there can be losers 
– i.e. states for which transfers to the supra-state entity exceed transfers received from the 
supra-state entity – and winners – i.e. states for which transfers to the supra-state entity are 
smaller than those obtained from the supra-state entity. Especially in the short run, a supra-
state role in UI entails some level of solidarity, in the form of redistribution among states. In 
the long run, the involvement of the supra-state level can include tools that prevent 
redistribution by requiring ‘winners’ to pay back, as we will discuss further in this section. 
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In Europe, the implementation of such a form of redistribution, even if only in the short run, 
would face challenges. One challenge is the acceptance by European citizens of the principle of 
solidarity, according to which citizens of a given state may have to finance part of the 
unemployment benefits provided to citizens of another state. Acceptance of this principle 
would represent a huge step forward towards a greater role for the EU. It appears to be 
anything but a formality, given the current context. According to Eurobarometer (2014), about 
40% of Europe’s citizens do not feel that they are European citizens. 
The fact that this question is even being asked demonstrates how fundamentally different 
Europe and the US are in this regard. While the ‘red state’/’blue state’ divide is quite significant 
in the US, public consciousness and political rhetoric regarding UI in the US do not really 
acknowledge interstate transfers as a major concern (although an understanding of the 
potential ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is imperative when designing a proposal that requires 
congressional action.) The dialogue about UI spending in the US focuses more on other aspects, 
not specifically related to the supra-state dimension (e.g., the impact on job creation, 
disincentives to seek work, benefit adequacy, and so on). It may be that Americans’ sense of 
common identity, history, language and culture is such that questions about interstate 
transfers of unemployment benefit spending do not generally get asked.  
The fact that interstate transfers are not a major concern in the US may also be due, in part, to 
the way the transfers occur. States do not directly make payments to the federal government 
to support unemployment benefits. Employers pay taxes to the federal government. State 
unemployment tax revenue is used for state benefit payments. Federal unemployment tax 
revenue is used for several purposes, including state costs to administer their UI programs, 
loans to states that run out of money to pay benefits, the federal share of the permanent 
extended benefits program, and any special temporary federal unemployment programs. 
When the federal unemployment reserves became depleted during the Great Recession, 
general revenue, which comes from a variety of sources, was used (such as federal income 
taxes and other revenue whose use is not limited to a specific purpose). Although some of the 
funds had to be paid back, a significant portion of federal unemployment spending did not. 
Recognising the urgency of making additional unemployment benefits available, these other 
federal funds were dedicated to this purpose. For these reasons, while the net transfers from 
employers in one state to unemployed workers in another state in terms of the federal 
unemployment spending could theoretically be calculated, the overall perception is that the 
transfer was going from the federal government to the states. When there were concerns 
about the level of federal spending during the Great Recession, they were generally about 
whether the economic conditions warranted additional action rather than about whether some 
states were contributing more to cover the cost of unemployment benefits than other states.  
Fostering development of a European identity to make solidarity among EU states more 
acceptable, as it is in the US, may seem to be too ambitious a goal. However, the way the 
interstate financial transfers occur in the US could perhaps be taken as inspiration to foster 
acceptance of a potential EUBS. For instance, to limit the temptation to calculate the net 
transfers from one country to another, perhaps a European payroll tax on top of national taxes 
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would be more acceptable than a system in which contributions would be a certain percentage 
of GDP collected directly from the member states (as proposed in the equivalent variants 
described in Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017). Likewise, benefits paid directly to unemployed 
people by a supra-state entity may be better than transfers to the state’s budget (even if those 
transfers are earmarked to the payment of benefits). Moreover, making solidarity and 
redistribution among states more acceptable in Europe may require rethinking how the 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ are determined to take a broader, more comprehensive approach when 
considering a UI scheme. Direct spending on unemployment benefits in a state is, of course, a 
necessary component of this calculation. However, there are other considerations that, while 
harder to quantify, are meaningful. Monetary union created winners and losers. So did free 
movement of labour. One might expect that, when taking a more expansive approach to 
making this determination, interstate transfers for unemployment benefits may not appear to 
be as inequitable as they presently do to some individuals. Furthermore, EU citizens do not 
seem to be against solidarity. According to Eurobarometer (2014), when asked “Will EU 
countries have to work more closely together as a consequence of the crisis?” more than 80% 
of EU citizens said yes.  
As an EUBS necessarily implies redistribution in the short run to be efficient, one solution that 
has been put forward to make it more acceptable is to include in the EUBS system provisions 
that prevent redistribution in the long run, such as experience rating at the state level, or claw-
back (Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017). Experience rating at the state level is a mechanism that ties 
a given state’s contribution to the supranational fund to the state’s likelihood of using it. Claw-
back would tie a given state’s contribution to the supra-state fund to the state’s balance vis-à-
vis the supra-state fund. On the one hand, such mechanisms would avoid the theoretical 
possibility of an EUBS giving rise to permanent winners and losers. They would also be helpful 
tools to address institutional moral hazard, which is another challenge raised by redistribution 
across member states (Beblavý et al., 2015; Vandenbroucke and Luigjes, 2016). The 
government of a recipient country may decide not to implement unpopular or costly policies if 
it knows that this will be compensated by an increased financial support from the federation. 
On the other hand, those mechanisms may limit the power of an EUBS to relax states’ budget 
constraints, stabilise the economy and improve redistribution. 
The way the American system deals with the issue of moral hazard suggests that there is a 
variety of possible responses. First, interestingly enough, exceptional measures like Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation or Extended Benefits programs, as well as the enhancement of 
benefits within the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, were implemented with no 
provision – like an experience rating or claw-back – aimed at preventing institutional moral 
hazard12. In general, despite some notable elements of interstate solidarity, for instance 
through EUC-like or EB programs, institutional moral hazard does not seem to be high on 
                                                     
12 Individual moral hazard is more of a concern in the U.S. For this reason, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job 
Creation Act of 2012, among other things, modified the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program to 
require that everyone receiving these benefits receive a reemployment and eligibility assessment, which verified 
the individual’s work search efforts and provided assistance with finding a job. 
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today’s political agenda in the US (Vandenbroucke and Luigjes, 2016). From this observation 
one could derive the conclusion that moral hazard should not necessarily be considered as a 
big issue in the design of a future EUBS either. At the same time, mechanisms other than state-
level experience rating or claw-back limit the possibility of institutional moral hazard in the US, 
and may also be appropriate for Europe. First, some limitations of redistribution among states 
in the long run also exist in the American system. When a state borrows from the federal 
unemployment account to finance its UI in the case of exhaustion of its reserves, the loan has 
to be repaid, and interest is charged on loans that remain outstanding for a specified period of 
time (Beblavý et al., 2015b). Moreover, experience rating does exist in the American system, 
though at the firm level: employers’ state taxes vary in any given year based on their experience 
with unemployment.13 (This is required under federal law as a condition for employers in a 
state to qualify for federal unemployment tax credits.) For this reason, employers who lay off 
more workers pay higher state unemployment taxes than employers who lay off fewer workers, 
in general. Note that in the US, experience rating systems vary in their effectiveness for 
different reasons, but the general rule is still accurate. 
Furthermore, institutional hazard may also be mitigated through supra-state monitoring of the 
unemployment programs implemented by states. In the US, there are several performance 
oversight programs14 in which the federal government reviews state actions for a sample of 
unemployment claims to ensure that their policies and operations are consistent with both 
federal and state law. While states had made searching for work a condition of ongoing 
eligibility for benefits many years ago, federal law was amended in 2012 to make this a national 
requirement as a condition of administrative grant receipt. Thus, when state operations are 
reviewed, an essential component is determining whether the state made proper eligibility 
decisions based on the work search requirements in state and federal law. In this case, if it is 
found that an individual did not engage in the requisite work search activities to maintain their 
eligibility for benefits, the state must adjudicate the issue and, if supported by the facts of the 
case, determine that the benefits were improperly paid and commence efforts to recover these 
amounts. 
Finally, the way the Extended Benefit (EB) program is financed in the American system can also 
be a model for Europe in mitigating moral hazard. EB lengthens potential durations by 50% of 
the entitled duration of regular UI benefits when the unemployment rate exceeds a threshold 
in a given state, and provides a 50-50 sharing of benefit payment costs between federal and 
state governments. Financing an equivalent EUBS in a similar way would be an option to 
prevent moral hazard. For example, the rule could be that for each euro received by a given 
                                                     
13 Tax rates also vary from year to year based on the reserves in states’ account in the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
14 For example, in the Benefit Accuracy Measurement program a sample of weekly unemployment claims is 
selected and auditors verify every aspect of the individual’s eligibility for benefits — this includes determining 
whether the proper amount was paid to the individual and whether the individual searched for work. In addition, 
the Benefit Timeliness and Quality program focuses primarily on state activity when adjudicating eligibility issues 
that arise on an unemployment claim. No matter what type of eligibility issue, states must meet a set of procedural 
requirements including making a reasonable attempt to obtain necessary information from all appropriate parties 
and explaining well in the written determination the rationale for their conclusion. 
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state from the supra-state entity, it would have to increase its UI spending by two euros. During 
the Great Recession, the EB program in the US was entirely financed by the federal government 
under a temporary change in the law; however, its original design can be enlightening for 
Europe. 
5. Flexibility: how far should states determine how unemployment insurance works?  
The current national unemployment benefit schemes in Europe are highly heterogeneous in 
terms of eligibility requirements, replacement rates, reference wages and duration of the 
unemployment benefits (Esser et al., 2013; Beblavý and Maselli, 2014b; Beblavý et al., 2015). 
Thus, when it comes to the design of a potential EUBS, one key question is whether it should 
entail a convergence of current national schemes or allow a certain level of heterogeneity. On 
the one hand, a certain level of homogeneity may seem necessary, in particular to prevent 
interstate competition, social dumping, or spillover effects (see section 3). On the other hand, 
the different choices made by different states about various features of UI may reflect 
(strongly) diverging political preferences (Beblavý et al., 2015). In addition, state flexibility 
enables innovation and is an opportunity to experiment with new ideas on a smaller scale. From 
a more pragmatic perspective, a homogeneous scheme may prove very difficult to achieve. 
Homogenisation through a genuine scheme would require substantial legal reforms at national 
level as well as substantial administrative effort (Beblavý et al., 2015; Coucheir et al., 2016). 
These hurdles would be less problematic if mere minimum standards were imposed on 
member states’ UI. However, imposing requirements about eligibility, references wages, the 
replacement rate or duration of unemployment benefits may be rejected by European citizens, 
who could resist such attempts to limit their national sovereignty in favour of the EU. 
In the US, there is significant variation among states in terms of the weekly benefit amount, the 
duration of benefits and the eligibility requirements for UI benefit receipt. This heterogeneity 
represented a pragmatic necessity more than a policy preference when the system was 
created. In the 1930s, the federal government had a much more limited role than it does now. 
For this reason, the US Supreme Court decided that several of President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives were unconstitutional because they attempted to expand the 
scope of federal action. Concerns over constitutional challenges strongly influenced the design 
of the UI program. It is for this reason that the US UI system is premised on strong incentives 
— tax credits for employers and grants to administer the program for states. From a legal 
perspective, states are not required to operate a UI program, which is why the Supreme Court 
ruled that it was constitutional.15 Federal law thus only establishes some broad requirements 
to ensure that states are operating genuine UI programs, while states retain substantial 
authority to establish their preferred program parameters. Even the temporary federal 
                                                     
15 The case is known as Steward Machine Company v. Davis (301 U.S.548 (1937)). 
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unemployment programs (EUC and EB) are technically voluntary.16 States sign agreements with 
the US Department of Labor indicating that they will administer these programs on behalf of 
the federal government as specified in operating instructions and the federal government 
reimburses the state for benefit and administrative costs. States have always chosen to make 
these benefits available to their unemployed workers, although they retain the right to opt out 
at any time. 
Nevertheless, some features of the American states’ UI schemes are harmonised, as a way to 
deal with principal-agent problems: i.e. in that way ensuring that the supra-state entity gets 
the states to behave in accordance with its wishes (O’Leary and Barnow, 2016). In the US, three 
options are used to deal with those principal-agent problems: mere guidelines, incentives and 
compulsory rules. Regarding guidelines, one example is that in the 1980s and 1990s, the US 
Department of Labor and federal advisory commissions set guidelines to states about the level 
of the weekly benefit amount and the duration of benefits. Until the Great Recession, these 
guidelines were largely followed (O’Leary and Barnow, 2016). In terms of incentives, as 
mentioned earlier, employers receive up to a 90% credit against the federal unemployment tax 
in states with UI programs in conformity with certain requirements, such as a minimum level 
for the state’s payroll tax rate and applying a firm-level experience rate to state unemployment 
taxes. In practice, all states conform to these requirements. Finally, harmonisation can also be 
attained through compulsory requirements that states are obliged follow. For example, it is 
compulsory for employers in all states to pay federal unemployment taxes. 
Overall, the main lesson that Europe can learn here is perhaps that pragmatic concerns may 
carry more weight than policy concerns when determining the extent to which flexibility should 
be maintained under any European unemployment benefit scheme. While opinions will 
certainly vary about what would be best for workers and for the economy of each member 
state, what is most important is achieving an outcome that is better overall than what is 
presently available to avoid the problems experienced in the past. 
6. How should the system manage big shocks? Rules vs. discretion 
As was already indicated above, the temporary federal programs that provide more UI benefits 
to long-term unemployed workers are among the key characteristics of the American UI 
system. With these programs, the US federal government has recognised that during recessions 
workers need additional assistance and that states should not bear the full costs.17 This aspect 
of the American system is an instructive example for Europe. Some authors have, indeed, 
                                                     
16 For instance, during the Great Recession, if a state did not want to enter into an agreement to pay EUC or the 
$25 weekly benefit supplement on behalf of the federal government it did not have to. Nevertheless, all states 
did. For Extended Benefits, however: the existence of Extended Benefits in states’ laws is one of the requirements 
to obtain tax credits; moreover, states can amend their EB laws regarding a variety of parameters.  
17 Note that some states also have their own solely state-financed programs to extend the duration of benefits 
during periods of high unemployment for individuals in approved training programs who have exhausted benefits 
or for other reasons. The California Training Benefits (CBT) scheme is one example. Others can be found here: 
https://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2016/special.pdf. 
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argued that what Europe really needs is not a UI system that offsets all shocks by some small 
fraction, but a system that protects against shocks that are rare, but potentially catastrophic 
(Beblavý and Maselli, 2014). One question is how to decide when such temporary programs 
should be activated in a given state. Two main options have been put forward. The first – which 
we can call rule – is to set a criterion, typically when the rate of unemployment exceeds a 
certain threshold, that would trigger the system automatically. The second one – which we can 
call discretion – is to decide on a case-by-case basis without any ex ante rule. 
Most American temporary programs are enacted in a discretionary way, in response to 
economic downturns. However, there are several major challenges to taking this approach. 
First, there is always a significant delay. It takes time for there to be sufficient awareness that 
economic conditions warrant additional action, and time to develop the program parameters. 
It also takes time for Congress to pass a bill and the president to sign it into law. And that is not 
the end of the challenge. It also takes time to prepare to administer a new program. When it is 
a discretionary program, the requirements are not known in advance. It takes time for 
operational guidance to be written and time to train staff, modify computer systems, and do 
everything else that is necessary to implement a new program. The Great Recession began in 
November 2007, but the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program was not 
enacted until June 30, 2008. Even after the program was up and running, these challenges 
continued because EUC was modified and extended several times –sometimes retroactively 
(see Nicholson and Needels (2011) for an evaluation of the program). With greater complexity, 
there are more operational issues, more public confusion and, inevitably, errors that must be 
corrected. Another challenge with discretionary programs is that they often are not sufficiently 
targeted to the states that are most impacted by the recession because some of these benefits 
have always been available in all states regardless of their unemployment rate. This is really a 
political issue: to win votes, there generally needs to be ‘something for everyone’ (i.e. 
something for every state). There was a similar rationale when determining the unemployment 
rates that would make certain tiers of EUC benefits available. 
The example of the Extended Benefits program further illustrates these points. EB was intended 
to establish a mechanism to automatically provide additional weeks of benefits when 
unemployment rates are high and rising. EB ‘triggers’ on when state unemployment rates 
exceed specified levels. In general, these benefit costs are shared equally between the state 
and the federal government.18 Experience with the program, however, has demonstrated that 
the triggers need to be reconsidered since the program either does not activate or activates 
much later than it should during a recession. (During the Great Recession, EB did not become 
available until early 2009 in many states.) It is for this reason that there has been interest in 
reforming the EB program so that it will function more effectively during the next recession and 
avoid the necessity of another ad hoc emergency program. 
The US experience clearly points out that discretionary programs might not be the ideal 
solution. This is probably also true for Europe: the multi-level governance structure, 
                                                     
18 This was true in the original design. During the Great Recession, 100% federal funding was provided. 
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institutional differences and the necessity to apply a subsidiarity principle make the decision-
making process potentially even slower than in the US (Beblavý and Maselli, 2014b). While 
discretionary elements may be politically more acceptable than a non-discretionary system, 
their potential downside also needs to be taken into consideration. Especially for big shocks, 
with severe economic and social effects, it is important to develop a UI mechanism that is highly 
responsive. 
7. Conclusions 
In recent years, there has been a revived interest in the idea of introducing a common European 
UI system. This debate was refuelled after the economic crisis starting in 2008 but already dates 
back to the 1970s. When it comes to the design of a potential EUBS, many have looked to the 
American case for inspiration: the two-tier US system has a longstanding, successful history and 
may therefore shed light on the key factors to take into consideration, including the strengths 
and pitfalls of the system. There has been a growing body of literature that draws lessons from 
the US system for a potential European UI, but only few studies have assessed whether these 
lessons are actually applicable to the European context. With this paper, we aimed to fill this 
gap. 
Supra-state involvement in UI might help to achieve some of the goals of UI, especially in a free 
market and currency union, because it addresses coordination issues. This was particularly 
evident when UI was created in the United States: there, a two-tier system had to be 
implemented to overcome interstate competition. Even though interstate competition may not 
be as important issue in Europe, an EUBS could help to deal with other coordination issues, 
including spillover effects. Supra-state involvement further increases the stabilisation power of 
UI by pooling risks at a wider than state level, which relaxes state budget constraints. This is 
especially necessary in a currency union, and the experience of recent years has demonstrated 
that it is needed in EMU, in particular. The American example shows that supra-state 
intervention has indeed provided efficient macroeconomic stabilisation during the Great 
Depression. Not only does the additional financial leeway provided by supra-state involvement 
improve macroeconomic stabilisation, it also contributes to other goals such as redistribution 
of income among individuals.  
The acceptance of the principle of solidarity (i.e. redistribution between states) may be one of 
the big hurdles a European level UI has to overcome. It is interesting to note that it is not 
considered as a big issue in the US. This is likely due to a weaker sense of European identity 
among European citizens, compared to the highly developed American identity in the US. But 
it could also be due to the way financial transfers occur between states in the American UI 
system, which should perhaps serve as an example for Europe. The American case also suggests 
that net transfers between states within the UI system are not the only factor to consider when 
determining which states win and which states lose. Other gains and losses that stem from the 
integration into the EU or EMU should also be taken into account. The issue of solidarity is also 
related to the risk of institutional moral hazard. The American example shows that there is a 
variety of possible tools to prevent institutional moral hazard. Those many different tools 
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should be considered in the design of a potential EUBS; the current proposals may have focused 
on too few tools to address institutional moral hazard. 
When it comes to the trade-off between harmonisation and flexibility for states’ UI system, the 
main conclusion is that even though a certain level of harmonisation would be desirable for an 
EUBS there are also arguments, both theoretical and more practical, to support flexibility. In 
the US, for example, pragmatic concerns have been the main driver determining how the UI 
system was set up. They also have led to substantial flexibility. At the same time, as in any 
principal-agent problem, the American example shows that a range of tools, including 
guidelines, incentives, or compulsory parameters, are available to arrive at a certain degree of 
harmonisation. This dual approach, i.e. pragmatism and combining several different tools, can 
inspire Europe to strike a balance between harmonisation and flexibility.  
We conclude by highlighting the role of the temporary federal programs launched by the US 
federal government at times of economic crisis, which have been a source of inspiration to the 
European context. A broad consensus has been reached that the EU, and especially EMU, needs 
additional stabilisation mechanisms to absorb big shocks – rather than a mechanism that 
absorbs small shocks as well. While the American temporary programs are typically launched 
or activated on the basis of discretionary decisions, this approach results in severe delays and 
requires political consensus. As a result, automatically launched temporary programs appear 
to be a better choice for an EUBS.  
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